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3 
Abstract  
 
This paper addresses two main questions concerning the relationship between tax reform, 
development aid, public revenue and public revenue instability in developing countries. Tax 
reform involves here a change in the tax structure in favour of domestic public revenue and 
at the expense of international trade tax revenue. The analysis uses an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 95 developing countries over the period 1981-2015, and the two-step system 
Generalized Methods of Moments approach. Empirical findings show that tax reform exerts a 
positive and significant effect on tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, with the magnitude of this positive 
effect increasing as the amount of development aid flows that accrue to developing countries 
increases. In addition, while tax reform exerts a reducing effect on tax revenue instability, the 
magnitude of this reducing effect diminishes as the degree of development aid volatility 
increases. Specifically, beyond a certain level of development aid volatility, tax reform 
enhances tax revenue instability. Overall, these findings suggest that a rise in development aid 
flows to developing countries should be accompanied by a lower aid volatility so as to ensure 
that tax reform would induce higher tax revenue while concomitantly reducing tax revenue 
instability in recipient-countries. 
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1. Introduction
The adverse effects of trade liberalization on public revenue, including through lower 
international trade tax revenue1 have raised serious concerns among policymakers in developing 
countries about how to replace the tax revenue losses to at least maintain the level of public 
revenue or eventually increase it. In light of the importance of ensuring a sustainable stream of tax 
revenue so as to finance development needs in developing countries (e.g., Brautigam et al., 2008), 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
as well as many researchers (Ebrill et al., 2001; Khattry, 2003; Chambas, 2005; Keen, 2012; Brun 
and Chambas, 2014) have advised that policymakers in developing countries should adopt a 
revenue replacement strategy. This strategy involves a tax reform - also referred to as "tax 
transition reform" (e.g., Chambas, 2005; Brun and Chambas, 2014) that entails a change in the tax 
structure in favour of domestic tax revenue, and at the expense of international trade tax revenue, 
as it is the case for developed countries (old industrialized countries). The proposed tax reform 
would therefore lead to a tax structure in developing countries that would be similar to that of 
developed countries. Few studies (e.g., Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010; Waglé, 2011; and Crivelli, 
2016; Moller, 2016) have examined whether developing countries have been able to recoup the 
lost international trade tax revenue through domestic public revenue. For example, Baunsgaard 
and Keen (2010) have obtained empirical evidence that middle-income countries and high-income 
countries have recouped the lost trade tax revenue from other sources. However, for low-income 
countries (LICs), the replacement rate is still low, although signs of recovery vary across these 
countries. Waglé (2011) has obtained that the tax recovery in LICs is much more robust than 
shown by Baunsgaard and Keen (2010), although long term replacement is statistically significant 
only for few LICs. Moller (2016) has reported that low-income countries that have enjoyed a 
significant tax recovery are those that have simultaneously initiated a process of democratization. 
Using a sample of transition economies in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and North 
Africa and the Middle East, Crivelli (2016) has obtained empirical evidence in support for the 
strong revenue replacement of total domestic tax revenue with trade tax revenue lost, including 
through the Value-added Tax (VAT), and the personal income tax (PIT). Even though these 
findings provide an insight into whether the replacement strategy has been successful or not, they 
do not provide a clear sense of the empirical effect of the tax transition reform (which for the sake 
1 Several studies have reported empirical evidence or emphasized the negative effects of trade liberalization on 
public revenue, including through international trade tax revenue (e.g., Bevan, 1995; Khattry, 2001; Khattry and Rao, 
2002; Keen and Ligthart, 2002; Berg and Krueger, 2003; Keen and Simone, 2004; Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009; 
Longoni, 2009; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010; Castanheira, Nicodème and Profeta, 2011; Waglé, 2011; Hisali, 2012; 
Crivelli, 2016; Moller, 2016; Cagé and Gadenne, 2018). 
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of simplicity, is henceforth referred to as "tax reform") on public revenue. To the best of our 
knowledge, the empirical question as to whether tax reform yields higher tax revenue remains 
unaddressed in the empirical literature.   
On another note, the few existing studies on the instability of public revenue in developing 
countries (e.g., Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al., 1995; Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2012; Ebeke, 2014) have 
reported that public revenue instability translates into higher instability of public expenditure, 
higher instability of both public investment and government consumption, as well as lower public 
investment. One could therefore question whether in addition to its possible effect on the level of 
tax revenue, tax reform also helps dampen the instability of public revenue, with a view to ensuring 
a stable and sustainable public revenue in developing countries. To the best of our knowledge, this 
question has not been addressed from an empirical perspective.  
The dependence of many developing countries on development aid (also known as official 
development assistance - ODA) for their economic performance, including tax performance, has 
led many studies to investigate the effect of development aid on tax revenue performance (e.g. 
Knack and Rahman, 2007; Brun et al. 2011; Remmer, 2004; Benedek et al. 2012; Ouattara, 2006; 
Clist, 2016; Morrissey et al. 2014; Yohou et al. 2016; Gnangnon and Brun, 2017). While these 
studies have not reached a clear-cut conclusion as to the direction in which development aid 
influences public revenue performance in developing countries, one study (Gbewopo et al. 2009) 
among the few existing studies2 on the determinants of tax reform in developing countries has 
reported that development aid inflows promote tax (transition) reform in recipient-countries. This 
might therefore suggest that development aid could matter for the influence of tax reform on tax 
revenue performance in developing countries. Additionally, as the instability of public revenue is 
a major concern for policymakers in developing countries, one could also question whether the 
volatility of development aid would not only matter for the instability of public revenue, but also 
for the effect that tax reform might have on public revenue instability in developing countries. To 
the best of our knowledge, this question has not been addressed in the empirical literature. Its 
relevance lies on the possible negative effects of aid volatility on recipient economies, including 
through undermining the capacity of policymakers in recipient-countries to finance and execute 
planned investments, and ultimately adversely affect countries' development prospects (e.g., Bulíř 
and Hamman, 2001; 2003, 2008; Hudson, 2015; Agénor, 2016).   
  
                                               
2 These studies include for example Mahon (2004); Sánchez (2006); Di John (2006); Castanheira et al. (2011); 
Lora (2012); Focanti et al. (2013); and Adandohoin (2018).  
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In light of the foregoing, the current article addresses empirically four questions:  
(i) How does tax reform affect public revenue performance in developing countries? 
(ii) Does the impact of tax reform on public revenue performance (if any at all) depend on 
the amount of development aid flows that accrue to developing countries? 
(iii) How does tax reform affect public revenue instability in developing countries? 
(iv) Does the effect (if any at all) of tax reform on public revenue instability in developing 
countries depend on the degree of development aid volatility? 
To address these questions, we use the total tax revenue-to-GDP ratio as the measure of 
public revenue performance. The choice of tax revenue-to-GDP ratio rather than total public 
revenue (which encompasses both tax revenue and non-tax revenue) to perform the empirical 
analysis rests on the fact that non-tax revenue is much more exogenous (and is less under the 
control of governments) than tax revenue. Additionally, tax reform is likely to influence mainly tax 
revenue. The empirical exercise has been conducted on a panel dataset containing 95 developing 
countries covering the period 1981-2015, and has used the two-step system Generalized Methods 
of Moments as the main estimator. Empirical findings are quite interesting. They suggest that tax 
reform is positively and significantly associated with tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. In addition, 
development aid flows influence positively the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, and the higher the 
amount of aid flows that accrue to developing countries, the greater is the magnitude of the 
positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. In other words, development aid flows 
enhance the positive impact of tax reform on tax revenue-to-GDP ratio in developing countries. 
On another note, while tax reform exerts a reducing and significant effect on the instability of tax 
revenue, the volatility of development aid inflows appears to enhance the instability of tax revenue. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the reducing effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability 
diminishes as the degree of development aid volatility increases, and beyond a certain level of 
development aid volatility, tax reform enhances the instability of tax revenue.  
The remaining of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how tax reform 
could influence tax revenue performance in developing countries and the extent to which 
development aid could influence the effect of tax reform on tax revenue performance in these 
countries. This section also elaborates on how tax reform could affect the instability of tax revenue, 
and whether this effect could be influenced by the volatility of aid flows. Section 3 presents the 
measurement of tax reform. Section 4 presents the model specification concerning the effect of 
tax reform on tax revenue, while Section 5 displays the model specification concerns the effect of 
tax reform on tax revenue instability. Section 6 discusses the econometric approach to estimate 
these models. Section 7 interprets empirical results, while Section 8 concludes.   
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2. Discussion on the effect of tax reform on tax revenue and tax revenue 
instability: to what extent development aid and its volatility matter? 
 
 2.1 Tax reform, development aid and tax revenue  
From a theoretical perspective, the effect of tax reform on tax revenue seems 
straightforward. Tax transition reform would be associated with higher tax revenue performance 
in developing countries if it genuinely more than compensate for the international trade tax 
revenue losses (due to a greater trade openness). However, if for some reasons some countries, in 
spite of effort to implement the tax reform, are not able to more than recoup the trade tax revenue 
lost, then the implemented tax reform might not generate higher tax revenue, including tax 
revenue-to-GDP ratio. For example, even though tax reform helps strengthens the capacity of tax 
administration, including in terms of human capacity to devise appropriate tax policy and the 
efficiency of the tax administration in collecting tax revenue, it might be difficult to expand the 
domestic tax base, particularly in poor countries (for example Least Developed Countries). This is 
because in these countries, structural characteristics such as lower real per capita income, higher 
concentration of the production structure in primary products, and the rise in the population size, 
might make it difficult to significantly raise public revenue in the course of a tax reform.        
Nevertheless, one may expect that development aid inflows would help overcome the 
adverse effects of these structural impediments on public revenue raising in the course of tax 
reform. In fact, the literature remains inconclusive as to the direction in which development aid 
influences tax revenue in recipient-countries: the findings have suggested that development aid 
could crowd out tax revenue performance, improve it, or exerts an effect on public revenue that 
could be conditional on the institutional quality prevailing in the recipient-country. Theoretically, 
the negative effect of development aid on tax revenue could arise from adverse incentives, the 
economic instability and difficulties in public administration of recipient countries. According to 
Azam et al. (1999), aid might reduce incentives of recipient governments to adopt good policies 
and build an efficient tax system. Similarly, according to Marteens et al. (2002) and Svensson 
(2006), recipient-countries could be motivated to satisfy donors rather than being accountable vis-
à-vis their citizen concerning the utilization of the aid flows received. Authors such as Knack and 
Rahman (2007) and Brun et al. (2011) have noted that the absence of coordination among multiple 
donors can further enhance the aforementioned adverse effects of development aid on public 
administration. On the other side, development aid could positively influence tax revenue in the 
recipient-economy through its direct positive incentives and positive impacts on public 
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administration, including tax administrations, as well as through its indirect positive effects on the 
economy. For example, Morrissey (2015) has argued that the effectiveness of public expenditure 
on human development and tax compliance could be enhanced thanks to higher development aid 
inflows. Along the same lines, Brun et al. (2011) have argued that the above-mentioned adverse 
effects of development aid on tax revenue could prompt aid-recipient governments to improve 
their tax performance, with a view to reducing their dependence on development aid. Additionally, 
development aid could help strengthen tax and customs administration capacities in recipient-
countries, and hence promote tax reforms. The empirical findings of the tax revenue impact of 
development aid is mixed and reflects the diversity of the theoretical expectations concerning this 
impact. Heller (1975), Gupta et al. (2004), Remmer (2004), and Benedek et al., (2012) have reported 
a negative effect of development aid on tax revenue. In contrast, Khan and Hoshino (1992), Gupta 
(2007), and Clist (2016) have obtained a positive effect of development aid on tax revenue. At the 
same time, Ouattara (2006); Mavrotas and Ouattara (2007); Morrissey et al., (2014) have found a 
statistically nil effect of development aid on tax revenue. Yohou et al. (2016) have reported that 
the effect of development aid on tax revenue performance is conditional on government stability: 
while aid directly lowers tax revenue performance, it enhances it for higher levels of government 
stability. Gnangnon and Brun (2017) have examined whether the sustainability of the impact of 
development aid on non-resource tax revenue performance of recipient-countries. They have 
obtained evidence that the sustainability of this impact depends on countries' development level. 
Specifically, for Least developed countries, the impact of development aid on non-resource tax 
revenue is yet positive, but not sustainable over time. In light of the foregoing, the effect of 
development aid on tax revenue remains an empirical matter. Nevertheless, if development aid 
could help expand the tax base, including by contributing to the expansion of productive capacities 
(that could help generate higher value added in the manufactured products) and possibly 
promoting economic growth in the recipient-countries3, then it would help generate higher tax 
revenue in these countries.    
We postulate here that if development aid contributes to enhancing tax revenue performance 
in recipient-countries, including through the above-mentioned channels, it would enhance the 
expected positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue performance. Otherwise, we would expect 
that the eventual positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue performance would diminish as 
                                               
3 Some studies (Levy, 1988; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Dalgaard et al., 2004; 
Gomanee et al., 2005; Karras, 2006; Galiani et al. 2016; Chauvet and Ehrhart, 2018; Harb and Hall, 2019) 
have reported that development aid could influence positively economic growth in recipient-countries.   
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developing countries enjoy higher development aid inflows, in particular if such aid provides 
disincentives to pursue the tax (transition) reform.  
 
 2.2 Tax reform, development aid volatility and tax revenue instability 
It is important to recall at the outset that the objective of the tax reform is to minimize the 
international trade tax revenue component of tax revenue in the tax structure. For many 
developing countries, imported products included machineries and consumption goods whose 
prices are set by the exporting countries, and that can fluctuate subject depending on the vagaries 
of the international market. As a result, the instability of the import tariff revenue (that would 
contribute to total tax revenue instability) would increase further to the volatility of import prices. 
Likewise, those developing countries that collect export tax revenue (as part of trade tax revenue) 
do not generally control the prices of those export products, as many of the products are primary 
commodities (or at least on low-value added products whose prices are subject to the vagaries of 
the international market), whose prices significantly fluctuate in the international trade market. 
Hence, these countries are subject to important fluctuations of import and export prices, and hence 
of their terms of trade, would experience an enhancement of the instability of international trade 
tax revenue, and consequently the instability of total tax revenue. As a result, by minimizing the 
share of international trade tax revenue in total tax revenue, tax reform would help reduce one 
important channel of the transmission of shocks to the tax revenue, i.e. international trade tax 
revenue (that would induce tax revenue instability). In this context, we could expect that a higher 
extent of tax reform would contribute to dampening tax revenue instability, as it would reduce one 
component of the tax structure subject to high instability.  
 In the meantime, the literature has underlined the high volatility4 of development aid. For 
example, Bulír and Hamann (2001, 2003, 2008) have shown that aid is more volatile than fiscal 
revenues, particularly in highly aid-dependent countries. The high volatility of development aid, as 
well as its adverse economic effects have been underlined in the literature by authors such as 
Lensink and Morrissey (2001), Tressel and Prati (2006); Cohen et al. (2008), Hudson and Mosley 
(2008a, 2008b), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009), and Hudson (2015). In particular, Bulír and 
Hamann (2001) have underlined that the typical pattern of aid disbursements tends to enhance 
                                               
4 It is worth emphasizing that the concept of development aid volatility is different from that of aid 
unpredictability. Celasun et al. (2008) have argued that aid volatility is an ex-post description of the 
variability in aid disbursements over time, whereas predictability of aid refers to the difference between 
disbursements expected ex-ante, and actual disbursements, during a given time-period. This, therefore, 
suggests that aid predictability reflects the confidence of aid-recipient-countries about the amount and 
timing of aid disbursements, while volatile aid reflects the significant ups and downs movements of 
development aid between two-time periods.   
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budgetary instability, and eventually overall economic instability, and reduce welfare. In the same 
vein, authors such as Cohen et al. (2008) and Hudson and Mosley (2008a) have reported a negative 
effect of development aid volatility on macroeconomic volatility. In light of the foregoing, we 
expect that higher development aid volatility would be associated with higher tax revenue 
instability. Furthermore, by enhancing economic growth volatility, higher aid volatility would result 
in higher tax revenue instability, as elements of tax base would experience a higher instability due 
to the economic growth instability.  
Overall, we expect tax reform would lead to lower tax revenue instability, whereas 
development aid volatility would enhance tax revenue instability. On another note, development 
aid volatility could make it difficult for countries to implement efficiently the tax reform. This 
could therefore lead tax reform to be associated with higher tax revenue instability in the context 
of higher development aid volatility. Additionally, the positive effect of development aid volatility 
on tax revenue instability could more than offset the reducing effect of tax reform on tax revenue 
instability, so that in a context of development aid volatility, tax reform might ultimately result in 
higher tax revenue instability. Put differently, while tax reform could contribute to reducing tax 
revenue instability including in the context of higher volatility of development aid, there might be 
a degree of development aid volatility which tax reform would induce higher tax revenue instability.     
 
3. Measure of tax reform  
To measure the extent of tax reform, we use an indicator that reflects the degree of 
convergence of developing countries' tax structure towards the tax structure of developed 
countries (qualified as "old industrialized countries"). To do so, we utilize the semi-metric Bray-
Curtis dissimilarity index (Bray & Curtis, 1957). The index is defined as: 𝑑𝑋𝑌 =
∑ |𝑋𝑗−𝑌𝑗|𝑗
∑ |𝑋𝑗+𝑌𝑗|𝑗
 , where 
X and Y are two different countries identified by j components of tax structure (direct tax revenue 
share; indirect tax revenue share; and international trade tax revenue share). Specifically, in the 
context of the current analysis, X represents a given developing country, Y refers to the developed 
countries (old industrialized countries), and the symbol "| |" refers to the absolute value. The 
index is a bounded measure comprising between 0 and 1 (or 0 and 100). It is worth emphasizing 
that the semi-metric Bray-Curtis dissimilarity index is largely used in the natural sciences as well as 
in other disciplines such as international trade (see for example, Finger and Kreinin, 1979; De 
Benedictis and Tajoli, 2007, 2008). This index has the advantages of not increasing in the number 
of sectors (or components) considered; of being invariant to proportional sub-classifications of 
the n sectors (or components) considered; and of not being subject to the double-zeros paradox. 
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It is also appropriate in the presence of skewed distribution (e.g., De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2007, 
2008).  
To obtain the index of convergence in tax structure of developing countries towards the tax 
structure of developed countries, we consider on the one hand the aforementioned components 
of tax structure (direct tax revenue share; indirect tax revenue share; and international trade tax 
revenue share) for a given developing country in a year t, which we compare to the average of the 
same components in the tax structure of developed countries. Thus, the dissimilarity index of tax 
structure for a given developing country (in a given year) is determined by: 
𝑑𝑖𝑡 =
|𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑡|+|𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑡|
+|𝑇𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑇𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑡|
[(𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑡)+(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑡)+(𝑇𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝑇𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑡)]
  (1) 
   
 where for a given developing country, DIRTAX, INDIRTAX, and TRTAX are respectively, the 
direct tax revenue share; the indirect tax revenue share; and the trade tax revenue share. For 
developed countries, DIRTAXAve, INDIRTAXAve, and TRTAXAve are respectively the average 
(over all developed countries, i.e., old industrialized countries, in a given year) of the direct tax 
revenue share; the indirect tax revenue share; and the trade tax revenue share. The indicator of tax 
reform for a given developing country in a given year, is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝐹 = (1 −  𝑑𝑖𝑡) ∗ 100, where 𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the Bray-Curtis dissimilarity index previously 
described. A rise in the values of TAXREF reflects a greater extent of tax reform, i.e, a convergence 
of the tax structure of developing countries towards the tax structure of developed countries. 
Inversely, a decline in the values of this index indicates a lower extent of tax reform, that is, a 
divergence between the tax structure of developing countries and the tax structure of developed 
countries. Appendix 1 contains the list of developed countries used as benchmark in the calculation 
of the indicator of tax reform.  
 
4. Model specification on the effect of tax reform on tax revenue  
To investigate whether development aid matters for the effect of tax reform on tax revenue, 
we draw on previous studies concerning the structural determinants of public revenue, including 
those that have assessed, inter alia, the public revenue effect of development aid (e.g., Ouattara, 
2006; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Bird et al. 2008; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010; Brun et al. 2011; 
Benedek et al. 2012; Brun et al. 2015; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; Morrissey et al. 2014; Clist, 2016; 
Crivelli, 2016; Yohou et al. 2016; Gnangnon and Brun, 2017) and postulate the following dynamic 
model:   
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𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑉)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Log(TAXREV)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2Log(TAXREF)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 Log(NAT)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4([Log(TAXREF)𝑖𝑡] ∗ [Log(NAT)𝑖𝑡]) + 𝛼5Log(OPEN)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6Log(GDPC)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7POLITY2𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼8SHVANONAGRI𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9INFL𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10Log(TERMS)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11Log(POP)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡              (2) 
 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 represents the total tax revenue performance of a given country i in a 
period t. It is measured by the ratio of total tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. The use of total tax revenue-
to-GDP ratio rather than total public revenue (which includes both tax revenue and non-tax 
revenue) rests on the idea that non-tax revenue is less under the control of governments than tax 
revenue, and tax reform is likely to influence mainly tax revenue.    
TAXREF stands for the index capturing the extent of tax reform for a given country in a 
given period. The analysis has used an unbalanced panel dataset (based on available data) 
containing 95 developing countries over the period 1981-2015. Data has been averaged over non-
overlapping sub-periods of 5-year so as to smooth out the effect of business cycles on variables. 
These sub-periods are 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 
2011-2015. 𝛼0 to 𝛼11 are parameters to be estimated. 𝜇𝑖 are countries' fixed effects; 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is a well-
behaving error term.  
Appendix 2 presents the description and source of the variables introduced in model (2). 
The standard descriptive statistics on these variables are provided in Appendix 3. The list of 
developing countries used in the analysis is displayed in Appendix 4.  
 
The variable "OPEN" stands for the standard measure of trade openness level, i.e., the share 
of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services in GDP. From a theoretical perspective, 
the effect of trade openness on tax revenue depends on numerous factors, including the structure 
of trade liberalization and the effect of the latter on each component of public revenue. These 
involve the extent to which quantitative restrictions have been replaced with tariffs, how tariff 
reduction affects imports, the price elasticity of demand for imports, the price elasticity of supply 
of import substitutes and how exports respond to trade liberalization measures (e.g., Ebrill et al. 
1999; Agbeyegbe et al. 2006). While in this context, it might be difficult to predict the effect of 
trade openness on tax revenue, one could expect on the one hand that trade openness could exert 
a positive effect on tax revenue, given that trade tax revenue could be easily collected. On the other 
hand, as countries will sooner or later further open up to international trade, including by 
significantly reducing tariffs on imports, international trade tax revenue would decline. As a result, 
total tax revenue would decline if no revenue replacement strategy has been developed. In this 
scenario, higher trade openness would be negatively associated with total tax revenue. Incidentally, 
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there could be an indirect effect of trade openness on tax revenue, notably through its effect on 
the manufacturing sector performance as well as on economic growth. Indeed, trade openness 
could contribute to higher value added on the manufacturing products in developing countries 
(e.g., Weiss, 1991; Wong, 2007; Njikam and Cockburn, 2011; Ackah et al, 2012; Bigsten et al., 2016; 
Mukherjee and Chanda, 2017). In turn, higher value added on manufacturing products (or lower 
share of value added in the agricultural sector) generates higher tax revenue (e.g., Balh, 2003; Bird 
et al., 2008; Thomas and Treviño, 2013; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; Brun, Chambas and Mansour, 
2015; Crivelli, 2016; Gnangnon and Brun, 2017), including higher domestic tax revenue. Likewise, 
greater trade openness could help promote growth (e.g., Kneller et al., 2008; Wacziard and Welch, 
2008; Chang et al. 2009; Christiansen et al. 2013; Camarero et al., 2016; Naito, 2017) and expand 
the tax base, which in turn, would enhance the positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue. In 
light of the foregoing, we conclude that the effect of trade openness on tax revenue to-GDP ratio 
is an empirical matter.  
 
"NAT" represents the net aid transfers (in constant $US 2015 prices). The effect of development 
aid on tax revenue performance in recipient-countries has already been discussed above in Section 
2. At this stage of the analysis, it is difficult to anticipate the direction in which development aid 
would affect tax revenue in recipient-countries. 
 
"GDPC" represents the real per capita income, which captures the development level. We expect 
the development level to exert a positive impact on tax revenue performance (e.g., Crivelli and 
Gupta, 2014; Brun et al., 2015) because its rise goes hand in hand with an increase in the demand 
of public services, and a higher degree of economic and institutional sophistication.  
 
"POLITY2" measures the level of democracy in a given country, and acts for a proxy for 
institutional quality. A better institutional quality is expected to induce higher tax revenue, 
including through a direct effect on tax revenue collection, and an indirect effect through the 
enhancement of the efficiency of tax administration in collecting public revenue (e.g., Ghura, 1998; 
Bird et al. 2004; Bird et al. 2008).   
 
The variable "SHVANONAGRI" represents the share of value added in non-agricultural sector 
in the total output. This variable has been introduced in model (2) following previous studies on 
the determinants of tax revenue performance. Many of the studies highlighted above on the 
determinants of tax revenue have shown that a rise in the agriculture share in total output results 
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in lower tax revenue performance because it is difficult to tax the agriculture sector. Additionally, 
for political reasons, some countries exempt a large share of agricultural activities from taxes (Bird 
et al. 2008). Therefore, we expect a rise in the share of value added on non-agriculture sector in 
total output to be positively associated with tax revenue performance.  
 
"INFL" has been calculated using the following formula (see Yeyati et al. 2007): INFL =
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) ∗ log (1 + |𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁|) (2), where |𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁| refers to the absolute 
value of the annual inflation rate (%), denoted "INFLATION". Higher inflation rates could 
generate lower tax revenue performance (Tanzi, 1977), and even more so if the tax system is not 
protected from inflation. Therefore, we expect that higher inflation rates would result in lower tax 
revenue performance.  
"TERMS" is the measure of terms of trade. We expect terms of trade improvement to exert a 
positive effect on tax revenue, as this would reflect a higher profitability for export industries and 
hence generate higher income tax revenue, higher corporate tax revenue (including for firms 
involved in international trade activities), and possibly higher trade tax revenue (when tariff 
revenue is collected on imported inputs) (see Agbeyegbe et al., 2006).  
 
"POP" is the size of the population in a given country. It has been introduced in model (2) to 
control for the effect of countries' demographic characteristics on tax revenue performance. In 
fact, Bahl (2003) has argued that in countries that experience faster growing populations, the tax 
systems may lag behind in governments' ability to capture new taxpayers. In this context, a rise in 
the population size would lead to lower tax revenue share. However, larger population size could 
lead to higher domestic consumption, eventually higher individual income, and hence result in 
higher tax revenue share.  
 
5. Model specification on the effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability  
The extent to which the effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability depends on the degree 
of development aid volatility is assessed by postulating model (3), which builds on previous few 
studies on the determinants of instability of public revenue (Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al., 1995 and 
Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2012). Model (3)5 is as follows:  
 
                                               
5 In model (3), we have included time dummies, but there were not statistically significant. Therefore, we have 
removed them from regressions. 
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Log(TAXREVINST)it = β0 + β1Log(TAXREVINST)it−1 + β2Log(TAXREF)it +
β3Log(NATVOL)it + β4([Log(TAXREF)it] ∗ [Log(NATVOL)it]) + β5Log(NAT)it +
β6Log(OPEN)it + β7Log(GRVOL)it + β8Log(GDPC)it + β9INFLit + β10Log(INFLVOL)it +
β11Log(TERMSVOL)it + 𝜎𝑖 + τit   (3) 
 
where the subscript i represents a developing country; and t the time-period. The same panel 
dataset used to estimate model (2) has been used to estimate model (3): it contains 95 developing 
countries over non-overlapping sub-periods of 5-year average data (1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-
1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2015). β0 to β11 are parameters to be estimated. 
𝜎𝑖 are countries' fixed effects; τit is a well-behaving error term.  
The dependent variable TAXREVINST is the measure of tax revenue instability. The one-
period lag of the dependent variable has been included in this specification so as to capture the 
potential state-dependence nature of the instability in tax revenue. In fact, Bond (2002) has argued 
that even if the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (s) is not the main coefficient of 
interest in the analysis, allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial for 
recovering consistent estimates of other parameters in the model. 
The variables TAXREF, OPEN, NAT, GDPC, and INFL are as defined in the previous 
section. NATVOL represents the volatility of real net aid transfers. It has been calculated as the 
standard deviation of annual growth of real net aid transfers over the above-mentioned non-
overlapping sub-periods. GRVOL, INFLVOL, and TERMSVOL are respectively the measures of 
volatility of real economic growth, the volatility of inflation, and the volatility of terms of trade. 
The economic growth volatility has been computed as the standard deviation of annual economic 
growth rate (growth rate of real GDP) over the afore-mentioned non-overlapping sub-periods. 
Inflation volatility has been computed as the standard deviation of annual inflation rate over non-
overlapping sub-periods. The volatility of terms of trade has been calculated as the standard 
deviation of the annual growth of terms of trade the over non-overlapping sub-periods of 5-year 
data. The effect of the volatility of development aid on tax revenue has already been discussed in 
Section 2. As for some other control variables, we expect higher inflation, as well as higher inflation 
volatility, economic growth volatility, and terms of trade volatility to be associated with higher tax 
revenue instability. The variable "GDPC", which stands for countries' real per capita income, (and 
represents countries' development level) has been included in model (3) to account for the fact 
that all countries do not have the same level of tax revenue instability. We do expect that countries 
with a higher development level would likely experience a lower tax revenue instability compared 
to other developing countries, given their capacity (in terms of human resources and institutions) 
to mitigate the effect of shocks on tax revenue, i.e., to reduce tax revenue instability.    
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The variable "NAT" represents the net aid transfers, in constant 2015 US dollars prices. 
Collier and Goderis (2008) have shown that development aid flows substantially reduces the 
adverse growth effect of commodity export price shocks in commodity-dependent countries. 
Along the same lines, Guillaumont and Wagner (2012) have reported evidence that development 
aid enhances growth acceleration in countries that experience a high structural vulnerability, 
including higher levels of shocks and higher exposure to shocks. As shocks could lead to higher 
instability in tax revenue, we can postulate on the basis of these studies that development aid flows 
would contribute to reducing the tax revenue instability. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) have also 
shown, inter alia, that development aid flows are procyclical with respect to recipient-countries' 
business cycles, but become countercyclical when recipients experience large macroeconomic 
shocks. As macroeconomic shocks could induce tax revenue instability, we could argue that 
development aid would result in lower tax revenue instability. Overall, we expect higher 
development aid flows to be associated with lower tax revenue instability. 
Concerning the trade openness variable ("OPEN"), the literature has established that there 
could be significant benefits associated with trade openness. These include stimulative effects on 
knowledge spillovers and investments in innovation (Grossman and Helpman 1991), higher 
productivity thanks to intra-industry trade (Melitz 2003) or intra-firm trade (Bernard, Redding and 
Schott 2006), efficient resource reallocation, and the reduction in a country’s vulnerability to 
idiosyncratic sectoral shocks through production and export diversification (Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti 1997; Haddad et al. 2011). For example, Haddad et al. (2011) have argued that trade 
openness can reduce countries’ exposure to shocks by enhancing the possibility of international 
risk sharing, through better integration into a broader range of global value chains as well as 
implicit and explicit insurance schemes such as joint ventures, international lending, production 
diversification and formal insurance contracts. Through these channels, including the ones 
highlighted by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) and Haddad et al. (2011), trade openness could result 
in lower tax revenue instability. All these different channels would contribute to dampening the 
impact of eventual external shocks that could affect an economy and, therefore help mitigate the 
transmission of these shocks to public revenue. In the meantime, trade openness can have a 
destabilizing effect on the economy through several channels (see Montalbano, 2011: page 1490). 
These include the apparent asymmetry between the process of increasing specialization and the 
presence of random, undiversifiable shocks in the export markets of open economies (e.g.,  Koren 
and Tenreyro, 2007); the volatility of commodity prices, especially in developing countries (in 
particular poor countries) whose exports are heavily concentrated in primary products (e.g., Malik 
and Temple, 2009); the difficulty of traditional coping mechanisms and local market structures to 
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cope with the shocks prevailing in open markets (e.g., Dercon, 2001); the occurrence of boom-
bust cycles of investment associated with higher trade openness in countries with inadequate 
infrastructures and shortages of skilled labor (Razin et al., 2003); and the high risk of policy 
management resulting from the response to new incentives induced by trade openness in weak 
political institutions (Rodrik, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2003; Fatas and Mihov, 2003). In addition, 
some studies (Raddatz, 2007; Loayza and Raddatz, 2007; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009; 
Haddad et al., 2011, 2013) have reported that higher trade openness is associated with increased 
volatility of a number of outcome variables (aggregate income, consumption, employment, salaries, 
and prices), notably in developing countries, that affect directly the tax base, including through a 
higher volatility of the elements of the tax base. This would ultimately result in higher tax revenue 
instability. It has also been demonstrated that trade openness, in spite of its benefits, could 
contribute to triggering “sudden stops” (e.g., Cavallo and Frankel, 2008) or serve as a channel for 
spreading out crises, including in regional contexts (Glick and Rose, 1999; Easterly and Kraay, 
2000). These channels can contribute to enhancing the volatility of the previously cited variables 
and hence, the tax revenue instability. Some studies such as Calderon, et al. (2005) and Kose and 
Yi (2006) have nevertheless reported no significant impact of a rise in the degree of trade 
interdependence on domestic macroeconomic volatility. In this scenario, trade openness would 
not be associated with higher tax revenue instability.  
 
6. Econometric strategy  
At the outset, we estimate by means of the within fixed effects estimator (denoted "FE-
DK"), static versions of models (2) and (3) (i.e., these two models without the dependent variable 
as a right-hand side variable), and without the interaction variables. The purpose of such 
estimations is to get a first insight into the effect of tax reform on tax revenue and tax revenue 
instability. In using the within fixed effects estimator, standard errors have been corrected for serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence in the dataset. The results of these 
estimations are provided in column [1] of Table 1 and column [1] of Table 2, respectively for 
models (2) and (3). However, as many variables of these two models are likely endogenous mainly 
because of the bias associated with the bi-directional causality between the dependent variables 
and some regressors, the outcomes based on the FE-DK estimator could be biased. In addition, 
the static versions of models (2) and (3) may suffer from the omission of the one period lag of the 
dependent variable as a regressor. Even for the dynamic nature of models (2) and (3), the presence 
of the one-period lag of the dependent variable in these models would induce a correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and specific effects. Against this background, we use the 
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two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) approach proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) to estimate dynamic models (2) and (3). This estimator combines the equation in 
differences with the equation in levels, with lagged first differences being used as instruments for 
the levels equation and lagged levels being used as instruments for the first-difference equation. 
This estimator is preferred to the first-difference GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) when cross-sectional variability dominates time variability and when there is a strong 
persistence in the time series under investigation (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Additionally, the two-
step system is recommended in the context of unbalanced panel dataset, as the difference GMM 
estimator has a weakness of magnifying gaps (Roodman, 2009). Regressors considered as 
endogenous in model (2) due to the simultaneity bias include TAXREF, NAT, GDPC, POLITY2. 
For example, while tax reform is expected to influence the level of tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, 
countries that experience lower tax revenue due, for example, to greater trade openness might be 
incentivized to engage in greater extent of tax reform. Similarly, countries with a relatively low 
level of tax revenue-to-GDP ratio are likely to receive higher real net aid transfers than other 
countries. Potential endogenous variables in model (3) include TAXREF, NAT, NATVOL, 
GDPC, OPEN, GRVOL. In fact, we expect here that higher instability of tax revenue could 
influence the level and volatility of real net aid transfers, the real per capita income, the degree of 
openness, and the volatility of economic growth. The validity of the two-step system GMM 
estimator is assessed using a number of diagnostic tests, including the standard Sargan  (OID) test 
of over-identifying restrictions, the Arellano–Bond (AB) test of the presence of first-order serial 
correlation in the error term (denoted AR(1)) and no second-order autocorrelation in the error 
term (denoted AR(2)). Furthermore, we have reported the number of instruments used in the 
regressions because too many instruments could reduce the power of the above-mentioned tests 
(e.g., Ziliak, 1997; Bowsher, 2002; Roodman, 2009). All regressions have used 2 lags of the 
dependent variable as instruments and 2 lags of the endogenous variables as instruments. 
 The empirical analysis based on the two-step system GMM technique proceeds as follows. 
First, we estimate models (2) and (3) without the interaction variable, with a view to analysing the 
effect of tax reform on tax revenue and tax revenue instability. The results of the estimations of 
these models are presented in column [2] of Tables 1 and 2, respectively for model (2) and model 
(3). We also check whether this effect is similar for poor countries and non-poor countries in the 
full sample. We follow the United Nations categorization of countries and consider least developed 
countries6 (LDCs) as poor countries. To perform the analysis, we define a dummy variable 
                                               
6 The UN has defined LDCs as the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world. For further 
information on LDCs, see online at: http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/ 
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(denoted "LDC"), which takes the value "1" for countries in the LDC category, and "0", otherwise. 
This dummy variable along with its interaction with the variable TAXREF are then introduced in 
the specifications of models (2) and (3) (without the interaction variables between TAXREF and 
NAT in model (2) on the one hand, and between TAXREF and NATVOL in model (3) on the 
other hand). The outcomes of the estimations of these models are displayed in column [3] of 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively for model (2) and model (3). Table 3 reports the estimates of model 
(2) as it stands, that is to investigate whether the effect of tax reform on tax revenue depends on 
development aid. Likewise, Table 4 displays the outcomes of the estimation of model (3) (as it 
stands), which allows examining the extent to which the effect of tax reform on tax revenue 
instability depends on the volatility of development aid.       
To provide a first insight into the relationship between key variables of interest in the 
analysis, we present in Figure 1 the development over time of the indicator of tax reform 
(TAXREF) and the tax revenue to GDP ratio (TAXREV), and in Figure 2, the development over 
time of tax revenue instability index (TAXREVINST) and TAXREF. Figure 3 shows the 
correlation pattern between TAXREV and TAXREF on the one hand (see the left-hand side 
graph), and TAXREVINST and TAXREF on the other hand (see the right-hand side graph). 
These different graphs have been performed using the dataset of 95 developing countries over 
non-overlapping sub-periods of 5-year average data. It could be observed from Figure 1 that 
TAXREV has remained relatively stable around 12.7% over from 1981-1985 to 2001-2005, but 
substantially increased over the rest of the period to reach 15.22% in 2011-2015. At the same time, 
TAXREF has steadily increased from 55.9 points in 1981-1985 to 56.2 points 1996-2000. 
However, it has substantially increased over the rest of the period, to reach 64.6 points in 2011-
2015. In summary, tax reform and tax revenue-to-GDP ratio have evolved in the same direction. 
Figure 2 suggests rather that tax reform and tax revenue instability have moved in opposite 
directions over the period 1981-2015. Concerning Figure 3, we note from the right-hand side graph 
that tax reform is strongly and positively correlated with tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, while the right-
hand side graph of this Figure indicates a strong negative correlation pattern between tax reform 
and tax revenue instability in developing countries.       
 
7. Interpretation of results  
Results (based on the FE-DK) in column [1] of Table 1 suggest that tax reform exerts a 
positive and significant effect (at the 1% level) on the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. With respect to 
results related to control variables in this column, we note that net aid transfers flows and inflation 
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do not affect significantly tax revenue performance in recipient-countries. Better institutional 
quality, proxied by the degree of democracy is positively and significantly associated with tax 
revenue, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation. Trade openness influences negatively 
and significantly tax revenue performance, while higher development level (proxied by the real per 
capita income) and the share of value added in non-agricultural production (in total output) are 
positively and significantly related to tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. The population size and terms of 
trade improvements influence negatively tax revenue, but their effect is loosely significant, i.e., 
statistically significant only at the 10% level.   
 Let us now consider results reported in columns [2] and [3] of Table 1 (results based on the 
two-step system GMM estimator). Before interpreting these results, it is important to discuss the 
outcomes concerning the diagnostic tests that help assess the validity of the two-step system GMM 
estimator. We note from these two columns of Table 1 (as well as from columns [2] and [3] of 
Table 2, and Tables 3 and 4) that the coefficient of the one-period lag of the dependent variable is 
always positive and significant at the 1% level, thereby indicating the state-dependence nature of 
tax revenue-to-GDP ratio (for results in Tables 1 and 3) and the state dependence nature of the 
instability of tax revenue (for results in Tables 2 and 4). These confirm the relevance of considering 
a dynamic specification of models (2) and (3). Results reported at the bottom of the columns of 
all these Tables indicate, as expected, that the p-values related to the AR(1) test are 0 (i.e., lower 
than 10% level, as expected), and the p-values associated with the AR(2) test are all higher than 
10%. Additionally, the p-values of the Sargan statistics are always higher than 10%. Incidentally, 
across all columns of Tables where results are based on the two-step system GMM estimator, the 
number of instruments is consistently lower than the number of countries. Overall, the two-step 
system GMM approach has passed with success all the afore-mentioned diagnostic tests, and is 
therefore appropriate for the empirical exercise.  
Taking up now results in column [2] of Table 1, we find that the coefficient of TAXREF is 
positive and statistically significant, although its magnitude is well below that of the coefficient of 
the same variable in column [1] of the Table 1. This result suggests that tax reform generates higher 
tax revenue in developing countries: a 1 percentage increase in the index of tax reform leads to a 
0.543 percentage rise in the tax revenue-to GDP ratio. At the same time, results in column [3] 
indicate that the coefficient of the interaction variable "LDC*[Log(TAXREF)]" is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This signifies that tax reform exerts a lower effect on tax 
revenue performance in LDCs than in NonLDCs. Nevertheless, the net effect of tax reform on 
revenue-to-GDP ratio is positive and given by 0.46 (=0.920-0.460), thereby suggesting that in 
LDCs, a 1 percentage increase in the index of tax reform leads to a 0.46 percentage rise in the tax 
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revenue-to-GDP ratio. In NonLDCs, a 1 percentage increase in the index of tax reform leads to a 
0.92 percentage rise in the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. Concerning control variables, we note that 
estimates reported in columns [2] and [3] are quite similar. Focusing specifically on estimates in 
column [2], we obtain that higher net aid transfers flows are positively and significantly associated 
with tax revenue performance in recipient-countries, while real per capita income and terms of 
trade improvements exert no significant effect on tax revenue. At the 5% level, the other positive 
drivers of tax revenue performance in developing countries include a better institutional quality, 
lower trade openness, lower inflation rates, higher share of value added on non-agricultural 
production in total output, and lower size of the population.   
 As for results in Table 2, we observe in column [1] (results based on the FE-DK estimator) 
that tax reform exerts a negative and significant effect (at the 1% level) on the instability of tax 
revenue in developing countries. This outcome is confirmed in column [2], although with a lower 
magnitude of the effect. Focusing specifically on results in column [2] (which is based on the 
preferred estimator), we obtain that a 1 percentage increase in the index of tax reform leads to a 
0.505 percentage fall in the values of the index of tax revenue instability. In column [3], we note 
that tax reform exerts a higher reducing effect on the tax revenue instability in NonLDCs 
compared to LDCs (the interaction term of the variable "LDC*[Log(TAXREF)]" is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level), although the net effect of tax reform on tax revenue 
instability appears to be negative and significant, and amounts to -0.356 (= -0.797+0.441). Hence, 
a 1 percentage increase in the index of tax reform leads to a 0.356 percentage decline in the index 
of tax revenue instability in LDCs, and -0.797 percentage decline in the index of tax revenue 
instability in NonLDCs. Estimates associated with control variables in columns [2] and [3] are 
quite similar notably in terms of the direction of the effects, although the magnitude of these 
effects could be different across the two columns. Focusing on the estimates associated with 
control variables reported in column [2], we obtain that while real values of net aid transfers inflows 
do not influence significantly tax revenue instability, higher volatility of net aid transfers flows does 
exert a positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) effect on tax revenue instability. At the 
same time, relatively advanced developing countries experience a lower degree of tax revenue 
instability than less advanced countries (for example poor countries). This is because the 
coefficient of real per capita income variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The other positive drivers of tax revenue instability in developing countries include higher level of 
trade openness, higher economic growth volatility, higher inflation volatility, and higher inflation 
rates, as well as higher terms of trade instability.  
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Let us now consider results displayed in Table 3. To recall, these results aim to examine 
whether (and if so) development aid flows matter for the effect of tax reform on tax revenue. We 
note from this Table that the coefficient of the interaction variable ([Log(TAXREF)]*[Log(NAT)]) 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient of TAXREF variable is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. These two outcomes suggest that there is a 
threshold of development aid flows about which the effect of tax reform on tax revenue-to GDP 
ratio becomes positive. Below this threshold, this effect is negative. This threshold of development 
aid amounts to $US 198581.1 [= exponential (0.932/0.0764)]. It is worth recalling that values of 
NAT range between $US 2528334 and $US 3.70e+09. These suggest that when values of NAT 
received are lower than $US 198581.1, recipient-countries experience a negative and significant 
effect of tax reform on tax revenue performance. As all values of NAT appear to be higher than 
this threshold, we do conclude that irrespective of the amount of net aid transfers that accrue to 
developing countries, the latter always experience a positive and significant effect of development 
aid on tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. This outcome is well reflected in Figure 4, which shows, at the 
95 per cent confidence intervals, the evolution of the marginal impact of TAXREF on TAXREV 
for varying levels of net aid transfers flows that accrue to countries. The statistically significant 
marginal impacts at the 95 per cent confidence intervals are those encompassing only the upper 
and lower bounds of the confidence interval that are either above or below the zero line. Figure 4 
shows that the marginal effect of tax reform on tax revenue is always positive, and consistently 
increases as recipient-countries experience higher net aid transfers inflows. This suggests that not 
only development aid enhances the positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue, but this positive 
effect increases as the amount of development aid flows that accrue to these countries increase.       
 Let us now take up estimates presented in Table 4. We find that the coefficient of TAXREF 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, the interaction term related to the variable 
([Log(TAXREF)]*[Log(NATVOL)]) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
combination of these two results indicate that on the one hand, tax reform exerts a reducing effect 
on tax revenue instability, and the magnitude of this reducing effect diminishes as the degree of 
development aid volatility increases. However, there appears to be a level of development aid 
volatility above which the effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability becomes positive, i.e., tax 
reform enhances tax revenue performance. This threshold of development aid volatility amounts 
to 4.55 [= exponential (1.034/0.0827)]. To recall, descriptive statistics reported in Appendix 3 
show that values of the volatility of net aid transfers range between 0.029 and 122.3, with an 
average of 0.96 and a standard deviation amounting to 5.59. Countries with a degree of 
development aid volatility lower than 4.55 experience a reducing effect of tax reform on tax 
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revenue instability, and for these countries, the lower the degree of development aid volatility, the 
higher the magnitude of the reducing effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability. However, for 
countries that experience a degree of aid volatility higher than 4.55, tax reform exerts a positive 
effect on tax revenue instability and, the higher the degree of aid volatility, the higher is the 
magnitude of the enhancing effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability. The extent to which 
development aid volatility matters for the effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability is better 
illustrated in Figure 5, which shows, at the 95 per cent confidence intervals, the evolution of the 
marginal impact of TAXREF on TAXREVINST for varying levels of the volatility of net aid 
transfers. Figure 5 suggests that the marginal effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability 
increases as aid recipient countries experience higher volatility of net aid transfers inflows. 
However, the values of these marginal effects could be negative and positive, and are not always 
statistically significant. Specifically, this marginal impact is statistically significant for values of 
development aid instability lower than (or equal to) 2.64 [= exponential (0.9699125)] and strictly 
higher than 8.48 [= exponential (2.137615)]. Thus, countries with a degree of aid volatility lower 
than 2.64 experience a negative effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability. In other words, for 
these countries, higher aid volatility reduces the instability of tax revenue, but the higher the degree 
of aid volatility, the lower is the magnitude of the reducing effect of tax reform on tax revenue 
instability. In contrast, when the level of development aid volatility exceeds the threshold 8.48 (for 
countries that experience aid volatility higher than this threshold), tax reform consistently induces 
higher tax revenue instability, and the higher the level of aid volatility, the greater is the magnitude 
of the positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue instability. Finally, countries with a level of aid 
volatility ranging between 2.64 and 8.48, experience no significant effect of tax reform on tax 
revenue instability.    
Results concerning control variables are to a large extent in line with those reported in Table 
2. Note that even though tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is our main measure of public revenue 
performance, we have also performed all the regressions above using total public revenue-to-GDP 
ratio as the dependent variable. The empirical results obtained are qualitatively similar to the ones 
so far obtained above. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper investigates two main questions. The first question relates to whether the effect 
(if any at all) of tax reform on public revenue performance in developing countries depends on the 
level of development aid that accrue to these countries. The second question is whether 
development aid volatility enhances or dampens the effect (if any at all) of tax reform on public 
revenue instability in developing countries. The empirical analysis has shown that tax reform is 
positively and significantly associated with tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, with the magnitude of this 
positive effect being lower for LDCs than for NonLDCs. Furthermore, the magnitude of this 
positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue-to-GDP ratio increases as countries receive higher 
amount of the aid flows. Incidentally, tax reform appears to influence negatively and significantly 
tax revenue instability, with the magnitude of this negative effect being lower for LDCs than for 
NonLDCs. In addition, the magnitude of this reducing effect of tax reform on tax revenue 
instability diminishes as the degree of development aid volatility increases and, beyond a certain 
level of development aid volatility, tax reform enhances tax revenue instability. Overall, these 
findings suggest that while donors should be encouraged to supply higher development aid flows 
to developing countries, they should also further cooperate with recipient-countries in order to 
reduce the volatility of such aid. Higher development aid flows and lower volatility of this aid allow 
tax reform to induce both higher tax revenue-to GDP ratio and lower instability of tax revenue.  
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TABLES and APPENDICES 
 
Table 1: Impact of tax reform on public revenue 
Estimators: FE-DK and Two-step System GMM 
 
 FE-DK Two-step System GMM 
VARIABLES Log(TAXREV) Log(TAXREV) Log(TAXREV) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log(TAXREV)t-1  0.570*** 0.526*** 
  (0.0324) (0.0310) 
Log(TAXREF) 1.050*** 0.543*** 0.920*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0427) (0.0717) 
LDC*[Log(TAXREF)]   -0.460*** 
   (0.0639) 
LDC   1.849*** 
   (0.269) 
Log(NAT) -1.34e-05 0.0559*** 0.0745*** 
 (0.00497) (0.0119) (0.0113) 
Log(OPEN) -0.0501*** -0.0951*** -0.0889*** 
 (0.00601) (0.0117) (0.0100) 
Log(GDPC) 0.0906** 0.0342 -0.0316 
 (0.0376) (0.0223) (0.0240) 
POLITY2 0.00459*** 0.00565*** 0.00325** 
 (0.00151) (0.00157) (0.00156) 
Log(SHVANONAGRI) 0.155** 0.244** 0.546*** 
 (0.0742) (0.106) (0.112) 
INFL -0.00357 -0.0284*** -0.0192*** 
 (0.00520) (0.00731) (0.00700) 
Log(TERMS) -0.0220* -0.00441 0.000787 
 (0.0121) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Log(POP) -0.0776* -0.0599*** -0.0440*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0111) (0.0106) 
Constant -6.145*** -4.059*** -7.209*** 
 (0.548) (0.354) (0.519) 
    
Observations - Countries 498 - 95 444 - 95 444 - 95 
Within R-squared 0.7722   
Number of Instruments  60 70 
AR1 (P-Value)  0.0000 0.0000 
AR2 (P-Value)  0.9096 0.6654 
OID (P-Value)  0.1740 0.1921 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. In the two-
step system GMM estimations, the variables TAXREF, NAT, GDPC, POLITY2 have been considered as 
endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. The regressions have used 2 lags of the dependent 
variable as instruments and 2 lags of the endogenous variables as instruments.  
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Table 2: Impact of tax reform on public revenue instability 
Estimators: FE-DK and Two-step System GMM 
 
 FE-DK Two-step System GMM 
VARIABLES Log(TAXREVINST) Log(TAXREVINST) Log(TAXREVINST) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log(TAXREVINST)t-1  0.0819*** 0.0660*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0195) 
Log(TAXREF) -0.742*** -0.505*** -0.797*** 
 (0.222) (0.0704) (0.138) 
LDC*[Log(TAXREF)]   0.441*** 
   (0.162) 
LDC   -1.937*** 
   (0.661) 
Log(NATVOL) 0.0435* 0.100*** 0.0951** 
 (0.0252) (0.0376) (0.0408) 
Log(NAT) -0.0469 -0.0342 -0.0422 
 (0.0717) (0.0394) (0.0341) 
Log(OPEN) -0.00511 0.179*** 0.219*** 
 (0.0611) (0.0482) (0.0495) 
Log(GRVOL) 0.0814*** 0.180*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0461) (0.0460) 
Log(GDPC) 0.0729 -0.0766** -0.128** 
 (0.0616) (0.0355) (0.0502) 
INFL 0.0735 0.175*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0264) (0.0270) 
Log(INFLVOL) 0.151*** 0.0779*** 0.0837*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0183) (0.0207) 
Log(TERMSVOL) 0.0825*** 0.137*** 0.131*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0217) (0.0234) 
Constant 0.662 -0.0803 1.477* 
 (0.901) (0.704) (0.787) 
    
Observations - Countries 475 - 95 419 - 95 419 - 95 
Within R-squared 0.2718   
Number of Instruments  78 79 
AR1 (P-Value)  0.0000 0.0000 
AR2 (P-Value)  0.3137 0.2599 
OID (P-Value)  0.5701 0.5557 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. In the two-
step system GMM estimations, the variables TAXREF, NAT, NATVOL, GDPC, OPEN, GRVOL have 
been considered as endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. The regressions have used 2 
lags of the dependent variable as instruments and 2 lags of the endogenous variables as instruments.  
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Table 3: Does the impact of tax reform on tax revenue depend on development aid flows? 
Estimator: Two-step System GMM 
 
VARIABLES Log(TAXREV) 
 (1) 
Log(TAXREV)t-1 0.594*** 
 (0.0269) 
Log(TAXREF) -0.932*** 
 (0.334) 
[Log(TAXREF)]*[Log(NAT)] 0.0764*** 
 (0.0182) 
Log(NAT) -0.254*** 
 (0.0743) 
Log(OPEN) -0.0982*** 
 (0.0113) 
Log(GDPC) -0.0154 
 (0.0196) 
POLITY2 0.00537*** 
 (0.00151) 
Log(SHVANONAGRI) 0.370*** 
 (0.101) 
INFL -0.0266*** 
 (0.00666) 
Log(TERMS) -0.0171 
 (0.0121) 
Log(POP) -0.0438*** 
 (0.00765) 
Constant 1.605 
 (1.376) 
  
Observations - Countries 444 - 95 
Number of Instruments 70 
AR1 (P-Value) 0.0001 
AR2 (P-Value) 0.9337 
OID (P-Value) 0.2232 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. In the two-
step system GMM estimations, the variables TAXREF, NAT, GDPC, POLITY2 have been considered as 
endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. The regressions have used 2 lags of the dependent 
variable as instruments and 2 lags of the endogenous variables as instruments.  
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Table 4: Does the impact of tax reform on public revenue instability depend on development aid? 
Estimator: Two-step System GMM 
 
VARIABLES Log(TAXREVINST) 
 (1) 
Log(TAXREVINST)t-1 0.0923*** 
 (0.0114) 
Log(TAXREF) -0.376*** 
 (0.0511) 
Log(NATVOL) -0.888*** 
 (0.0780) 
[Log(TAXREF)]*[Log(NATVOL)] 0.248*** 
 (0.0202) 
Log(NAT) -0.0237 
 (0.0227) 
Log(OPEN) 0.0453 
 (0.0444) 
Log(GRVOL) 0.137*** 
 (0.0358) 
Log(GDPC) -0.0350 
 (0.0292) 
INFL 0.0865*** 
 (0.0177) 
Log(INFLVOL) 0.105*** 
 (0.0128) 
Log(TERMSVOL) 0.131*** 
 (0.0199) 
Constant -0.288 
 (0.431) 
  
Observations - Countries 419 - 95 
Number of Instruments 88 
AR1 (P-Value) 0.0000 
AR2 (P-Value) 0.2014 
OID (P-Value) 0.7436 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. In the two-step system 
GMM estimations, the variables TAXREF, NAT, NATVOL, GDPC, OPEN, GRVOL have been considered as 
endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. The regressions have used 2 lags of the dependent variable 
as instruments and 2 lags of the endogenous variables as instruments.  
 
 
  
Études et Documents n° 14, CERDI, 2019
37
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of TAXREV and TAXREF_Over the Full Sample 
 
 
Source: Authors 
Note: TAXREV is expressed in percentage of GDP. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of TAXREVINST and TAXREF_Over the Full Sample 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure 3: Correlation pattern between TAXREF, TAXREV and TAXREVINST 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
Figure 4: Marginal Impact of "TAXREF" on "TAXREV", for varying levels of development aid 
flows 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure 5: Marginal Impact of "TAXREF" on "TAXREVINST", for varying levels of development 
aid flows 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
Appendix 1: List of developed countries (Old Industrialized countries) used to compute the index 
of convergence in tax structure index for developing countries in the analysis 
 
Developed Countries 
Australia Japan 
Austria Luxembourg 
Belgium Netherlands 
Canada New Zealand 
Denmark Norway 
Finland Portugal 
France Spain 
Germany Sweden 
Greece Switzerland 
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Appendix 2: Definition and Source of variables 
 
Variables Definition Source 
TAXREV 
This is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, which represents the difference between the 
ratio of the total public revenue to GDP and the ratio of non-tax revenue to GDP. 
ICTD Public Revenue Dataset. See online:  
https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/government-
revenue-dataset 
TAXREVINST 
This is the measure of the tax revenue instability. It has been calculated as the 
standard deviation of annual growth rate of tax revenue-to-GDP ratio over non-
overlapping sub-periods of 5-year data. 
Author’s calculation based on data from the 
ICTD database. 
TAXREF 
This the index of convergence of the tax structure of a given developing country 
towards the developed countries' tax structure. Its values range between 0 and 100, 
with a rise in these values reflecting greater tax structure convergence, i.e., greater tax 
reforms.   
Author's computation (see Section 3) based on 
data extracted from the ICTD Public Revenue 
Dataset. See online:  
http://www.ictd.ac/index.php/dataset#core-
dataset 
TERMS 
This is the measure of terms of trade. Terms of trade represent the ratio of the 
export price index to import price index.  
Authors' calculation based on data from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the 
World Bank 
TERMSVOL 
This is the measure of terms of trade instability. Terms of trade represent the ratio of 
the export price index to import price index. Terms of trade volatility has been 
calculated as the standard deviation of annual terms of trade growth over 5-year 
non-overlapping sub-periods. 
Authors' calculation based on terms of trade data 
previously described.  
INFL 
The variable "INFL" has been calculated using the following formula (see Yeyati et 
al. 2007): INFL = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) ∗ log (1 + |𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁|) (2), where 
|𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁| refers to the absolute value of the annual inflation rate (%), denoted 
"INFLATION".   
The annual inflation rate (%) is based on Consumer Price Index -CPI- (annual %) 
where missing values has been replaced with values of the GDP Deflator (annual 
%). 
Authors' calculation based on data from the WDI. 
INFLVOL 
Inflation volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of inflation rate over 5-year 
non-overlapping sub-periods.  
Authors' calculation based on inflation data 
extracted from the WDI 
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GRVOL 
This is the measure of the volatility of economic growth rate. It has been calculated 
as the standard deviation of annual economic growth rate (growth rate of real GDP) 
over non-overlapping sub-periods of 5-year. 
Authors' calculation based on economic growth 
rate data extracted from the WDI 
OPEN 
This is the measure of trade openness (de facto trade openness). It is calculated as 
the sum of exports and imports, in % GDP 
WDI 
GDPC GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) WDI 
NAT 
This is the Net Aid Transfers (NAT), in Constant 2015 US$ prices. This is 
the net Official Development Assistance (ODA), from which are subtracted 
principal payments are received on ODA loans, interest received on such loans and 
debt relief. 
NAT data (in current prices) are extracted from 
the database compiled by David Roodman (see 
online: http://davidroodman.com/data/)  
NATVOL 
This is the measure of the volatility of the Net Aid Transfers. It has been 
calculated as the standard deviation of the growth rate of the Net Aid Transfers over 
non-overlapping sub-periods of 5-year. 
Authors' calculation 
SHVANONAGRI Share of Value Added in non-Agriculture, in % of total output value added. United Nations Database 
POLITY2 
This is an index extracted from Polity IV Database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). It 
represents the degree of democracy based on competitiveness of political 
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and 
constraints on the chief executive. Its values range between -10 and +10, with lower 
values reflecting autocratic regimes, and greater values indicating democratic 
regimes. Specifically, the value +10 for this index represents a strong democratic 
regime, while the value -10 stands for strong autocratic regime.   
Polity IV Database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) 
POP Total Population WDI 
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Appendix 3: Standard Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
TAXREV 594 0.132 0.615 0.127 0.461 
TAXREF 519 58.903 15.295 8.573 96.195 
TAXREVINST 567 0.133 0.203 0.004 2.971 
NAT 630 4.64e+08 5.10e+08 2528334 3.70e+09 
OPEN 613 75.280 39.768 0.198 419.408 
GDPC 624 2515.565 2685.778 157.150 15381.560 
SHVANONAGRI 638 77.555 13.635 34.478 98.817 
INFLATION 629 60.350 361.001 -4.253 5438.696 
TERMS 625 106.205 66.745 13.347 762.396 
POP 648 3.04e+07 1.04e+08 253041.2 1.18e+09 
POLITY2 633 0.179 5.691 -10.000 10.000 
GRVOL 616 4.056 5.411 0.144 70.380 
INFLVOL 626 84.743 692.385 0.239 10795.530 
TERMSVOL 607 0.246 0.499 0.014 9.808 
NATVOL 613 0.962 5.586 0.029 122.321 
 
Appendix 4: List of countries in the full sample and the sub-sample of LDCs 
 
 
 
Full Sample LDCs 
Albania Georgia Namibia Angola Sudan 
Algeria Guatemala Nepal Bangladesh Tanzania 
Angola Guinea Niger Benin Uganda 
Armenia Guinea-Bissau Nigeria Bhutan Yemen, Rep. 
Azerbaijan Guyana Pakistan Burkina Faso Zambia 
Bangladesh Haiti Panama Burundi  
Benin Honduras Papua New Guinea Cambodia  
Bhutan India Paraguay Central African Republic  
Bolivia Indonesia Peru Chad  
Botswana Iran, Islamic Rep. Philippines Comoros  
Brazil Jamaica Romania Congo, Dem. Rep.  
Bulgaria Jordan Rwanda Equatorial Guinea  
Burkina Faso Kazakhstan Senegal Eritrea  
Burundi Kenya Sierra Leone Ethiopia  
Cambodia Kyrgyz Republic Solomon Islands Gambia, The  
Cameroon Lao PDR South Africa Guinea  
Cape Verde Lebanon Sri Lanka Guinea-Bissau  
Central African Republic Lesotho Sudan Haiti  
Chad Liberia Suriname Lao PDR  
Comoros Libya Swaziland Lesotho  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Macedonia, FYR Tajikistan Liberia  
Congo, Rep. Madagascar Tanzania Madagascar  
Costa Rica Malawi Thailand Malawi  
Cote d'Ivoire Malaysia Tunisia Mauritania  
Dominican Republic Mauritania Uganda Mozambique  
El Salvador Mauritius Ukraine Myanmar  
Equatorial Guinea Mexico Uzbekistan Nepal  
Eritrea Moldova Venezuela, RB Niger  
Ethiopia Mongolia Yemen, Rep. Rwanda  
Fiji Morocco Zambia Senegal  
Gabon Mozambique Zimbabwe Sierra Leone  
Gambia, The Myanmar  Solomon Islands  
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